ZONING-ELIMINATION

OF NONCONFORMING USE BY AMORTI-

ZATION: MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
A TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.

Hoffmann v. Kineily

(Mo. 1965).
The relators owned two adjoining lots that had been used since
1910 by their construction business, for the open storage of lumber.
Directly across the alley the construction company also maintained
an office and a garage. A zoning ordinance classified the block into
two different zones, placing the storage lots in a residential zone and
the garage and the office in an industrial zone. Nearby in the industrial zone was located a planing mill which stored lumber in the
open. There were several taverns and stores in the residential zone in
close proximity of the relators' lots. In 1950 the existing zoning ordinance was amended to provide that "the use of land within any
dwelling district... for purposes of open storage.., shall be discontinued within six (6) years.... ." In 1963 the Building Commission denied the relators' application for a certificate of occupancy.
The Board of Adjustment, the defendants in the action, affirmed the
decision of the Building Commission, as did the circuit court on
certiorari. The relators appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
They contended that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
violated article 1, section 26, of the Constitution of Missouri, which
states that "private property shall not be taken or damaged without
just compensation." The supreme court reversed the lower decision,
holding that the termination of a pre-existing lawful nonconforming
use by "amortization zoning" was a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation and was not justifiable under
the police power, which may never transcend constitutional rights
and limitations. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965).
Zoning ordinances seek to subserve the general welfare of the
community through the orderly separation of the municipality into
districts based on the use of the land. By grouping compatible uses
the municipal planners attempt to stabilize the use of the land, conserve the land value, preserve the character of the neighborhood,
facilitate the implementation of governmental services, and promote
the health, safety, and welfare of the community. The authority to
1 Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. 1965), referring to St. Louis,
Mo., Ordinance 45309 § 5(B), April 25, 1950. According to the court the later codifi-

cation reads: "The use of land within any dwelling district for the purpose of open
storage is prohibited." ST. Louis, Mo., CODE § 903.030 (1960).
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regulate the use of privately owned land stems from the states' power,
commonly called police power, to pass laws to promote health,

safety, and property protection. Some of this power is usually 2passed
on to local communities through enabling statutes of the state.
When zoning statutes were first enacted,' they were believed by
many to be an encroachment on the property rights of the individual
without "due process" or just compensation, in contradiction to the
fourteenth and fifth amendments of the federal constitution. For
prospective zoning 4 the issue was settled in 1926 when the United
States Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of zoning in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." The plaintiff in that case attempted to
enjoin the enforcement of a zoning ordinance which classified a
portion of his land as residential. He contended that the ordinance
deprived him of property without "due process" of law. The plaintiff
introduced evidence to prove that the rezoning of his undeveloped
land from industrial to residential reduced the value from $10,000
an acre to $2,500. The Court reasoned that such zoning enactments
must be justified through the police power of the state, and as such
they will be constitutional only if: (1) the goals of the ordinance
are the promotion of public health, safety, or general welfare and
(2) the provisions of the ordinance are not applied in an arbitrary
or unreasonable manner.' The Court ruled that the facts in each case
must be examined in connection with the particular circumstances
and locality and that, where the constitutionality is debatable, the
Court will not substitute its opinion for the legislature's. 7 Under the
facts in the Euclid case, the Court found that the ordinance was
reasonably applied and the classification of the property into a residential zone related to the public welfare because it enabled the city
2 See 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 1-7 (1958); 1 YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§
115-29 (1956).
3 The first comprehensive zoning statute was passed by New York City in 1919 and
its validity was affirmed in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313,
128 N.E. 209 (Ct. App. 1920).

4 Prospective zoning regulates the future use of land or buildings rather than attempting to terminate uses which pre-exist the zoning enactment.
5 272 U.S. 365 (1926), 54 A.L.R. 1016.
o Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 5, at 395. To be reasonable an ordinance

"must not disfavor some as against others in the same class; must not create unfair

discriminations; must not deprive persons of equality before the 'Law'; must not be so

arbitrary in their terms or in their administration as to make the granting or the withholding of permission to use property subject to the mere will of some officials; must
not deprive of time honored procedure and rights which have become ingrained as part
of the 'Law'." 1 M TZNBAUm, LAW OF ZONING 187 (2d ed. 1955).
7 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 5, at 388.
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to control traffic congestion and fire hazards and improve police protection.8 As a result, the ordinance was deemed constitutional.
In Nectow v. City of C~mbridge9 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an ordinance which classified a one-hundred foot strip of
plaintiff's land as residential when the tract was located between
industrial and residential areas. The Court reasoned that the ordinance as it applied to the landowner did not substantially promote
the public welfare and was unreasonable in that it rendered the land
totally without value.' 0
Applying the logic established in Euclid, the Supreme Court of
Missouri in 1927 approved11 the validity of zoning in State ex rel.
Oliver Cadillad Co. v. Christopher.1 The Missouri court denied the
landowner a permit to construct an automobile showroom and garage
in a residential zone. The court reasoned that it was a valid exercise
of police power to create a residential district to the exclusion of
industry because to do so would enable the city to promote the community welfare. 8 Finding that the application was reasonable as to
the landowner, 4 the court affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. Further, the court decided that a land use can be regulated
by police power without compensation:
If, on the whole, those affected are benefited by the measure, if the
right surrendered can no longer, in the light of advancing public
opinion, be retained in its fullness by its present possessor, if the
sacrifice to him is slight or if the number affected is great, so that
compensation is impracticable-in all such cases compensation is not
provided for.' 5
Both Euclid and Oliver Cadillac dealt with the constitutionality of
prospective zoning and not with zoning which provides for the
termination of established uses, as does "amortization zoning."
Early city planners thought that nonconforming uses'" could evenat 391-95.
U.S. 183 (1928).
10 Id. at 187-88.
11 Missouri had previously held zoning laws unconstitutional, although there was no
enabling act at the time. See City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 256 S.W. 489
(1923); State ex rel. Better Built Home & Mortgage Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 130,
256 S.W. 495 (1923).
12 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720, error dismissed, 278 U.S. 662 (1927).
18 Id. at 1192, 298 S.W. at 724.
14 Id. at 1194-96, 298 S.W. at 725-26.
15 Id. at 1192, 298 S.W. at 724, quoting WiLLIA s, THE LAw OF CrrY PLAN.
8 Id.

9 277

NING & ZONING, at 25.

16 A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective date of a rezoning
plan but not in conformity with the provisions of the plan. See 1 YOKLEY, ZONING
LAw & PRAcvxcE 148 (2d ed. 1953).
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tually be eliminated by the persistent enforcement of zoning regulations prohibiting the expansion or alteration of such uses and the
final termination once the use was abandoned. 17 In spite of such
beliefs the nonconforming use remains the most serious difficulty in
effective zoning. As one writer commented, "until some method is
devised to permanently eliminate the nonconforming use... effective
city planning cannot be achieved.""' Two primary methods have
been used to combat the problem-condemnation and amortization.
While condemnation through eminent domain has proven too
costly,'" amortization has been called "a more realistic and economically sound method.., to get rid of the existing nonconforming
use."20 Under the amortization technique the property owner is given
a period of grace sufficiently long to permit him to amortize2' his
investment, after which the nonconforming use must be terminated.
The grace period gives the landowner an opportunity to plan his
future as well as a period of time in which his profits might increase
because of the restriction on new competition created by the zoning
ordinance.
Hoffmann represents the first case in which the Supreme Court of
Missouri has considered the constitutionality of amortization zoning.
The court expressly refused to be swayed by the holdings of other
jurisdictions and focused its attention on the basic constitutional right
of the matter.2 The court reasoned that the relators had established
a lawful use on their land which gave them a "vested right" 2 which
could not be diminished by the enactment of a zoning ordinance. To
bolster its position the court reasoned that an immediate termination
of a nonconforming use is unconstitutional24 and it would be illogical
to hold the ordinance constitutional merely because it postponed the
17

Moore, The Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 6 Wm. & MARY L.

REv.

1, 2-3 (1965).

18 Hertz, Non-Conforming Uses: Problems and Methods of Elimination, 33 DicrA
93 (1956).
19 44 CORNELL LQ. 450, 453 (1959); 1951 Wis. L. REV. 685, 696.
20 3 WrrKN,SuMmaRY oF CA iF. LAw, 1990 (7th ed. 1960).
21 In zoning, the word amortization is not used in the accounting

sense, and it has
been suggested that the term be dropped in favor of "theoretical depreciation," since the
nonconforming use may still have a useful life at the end of the grace period. Katarindc,
Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, & Structures By AmortizationConcept v. Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1963).
22 389 S.W.2d at 752.
23 Vested rights are those of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice, or of which he could not justly be deprived other than by the established methods of procedure and for the public welfare. BLACK, LAw DicTioNAR.Y
(4th ed. 1951).
24 Accord, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930) (immediate termination of mental hospitals held unconstitutional).
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involuntary termination of the use for a reasonable time. In effect, the
court held that once a use has been established it is of such a pro-

tected nature that the balancing of private loss with public gain is
no longer the appropriate consideration. As a result the Euclid test
was inapplicable and the court's earlier decision in Oliver Cadillac
was not controlling. The court echoed the warning of Mr. Justice
Holmes:
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by5 a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.

2

The holding is in keeping with dicta of many previous Missouri
cases, 20 but in other jurisdictions there appears to be a well established trend in the other direction. One of the first amortization
clauses to be tested was in State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
McDonald,28 where a New Orleans ordinance provided that all businesses in a residential zone were to be excluded within one year.
After the year had elapsed, the Supreme Court of Louisiana approved
the termination of a grocery store which had operated in the area
for many years. In extending the rule of the Euclid case the court
stated: "The ordinance [in Euclid] did not deal . . . with already
established business. . . .But, if the village had the authority to
create and maintain a purely residential district . . . if ... not arbi-

trary and unreasonable, it follows necessarily that the village was
vested with authority to remove any business or trade from the dis25

398 S.W.2d at 753, quoting from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.

393, 416 (1922).
26 Brown v. Gambrel, 358 Mo. 192, 198, 213 S.W.2d 931, 935 (1948); Women's
Christian Ass'n of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 709-10, 190 S.W.2d 900, 906
(1945); In re Botz, 236 Mo. App. 566, 159 S.W.2d 367 (1942) (ordinance allowed
continuance of nonconforming use). Contra, State ex rel. Capps v. Bums, 353 S.W.2d
829, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). ("Many ordinances limit the life of nonconforming
uses to a period of years and such ordinances have been approved.")
27 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) (dosing of service station after ten-year period held a
reasonable exercise of police power); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954) (termination of cement batching plant
within twenty years approved); City of La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrel Planing Mill,
146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956) (Twenty-year amortization was not reasonable as it applied to defendant) ; City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342
P.2d 602 (1959) (one-year amortization approved for a repair yard), see criticism in
35 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1959). Contra, City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St.
382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953) (a zoning ordinance may not divest a vested property
right in a junk yard after a one-year grace period) ; Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 130
N.E.2d 342 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (amortization ordinances were confiscatory, unreasonable, and discriminatory).
28 168 La. 171, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
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trict and to fix a limit of time in which the same shall be done. 29
After this rather extreme application of amortization,"0 the theory
was refined and clarified in many opinions, particularly in City of Los
32
Angeles v. Gage31 and Harbison v. City of Buffalo.
In Gage, a California case, the city sued to enjoin the defendants
from using their property for a plumbing business after the five-year
amortization period had lapsed. The district court of appeal upon
examining the particular facts found that (1) the zoning ordinance
was enacted to regulate the use of property in an effort to protect
the public health, morals, safety, and general welfare and (2) the
application of the ordinance was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
as it applied to the property of the defendants.3 3 The California
court reasoned that all zoning affects every piece of property in a
retroactive manner since it applies to property already owned at the
time of the effective date of the ordinance. The court concluded that
there was no material distinction between an ordinance restricting
future uses and one requiring the termination of present uses. The
distinction would merely be one of degree and the constitutionality
of both would depend on the relative importance to be given
to the public gain versus the private loss. The court examined
the private loss and determined that the defendants' cost of relocating his plumbing business would be $1,000, or less than one percent
of his minimum gross business for the five-year amortization period.
Thus, his amortized loss was small compared to the public gain.3
In Harbison, a New York case, it was held that an amortization
zoning ordinance would be constitutional if its termination provisions
were reasonable as applied to the circumstances in each case. The
New York court adopted the following guidelines to determine what
is reasonable: (1) nature of the neighborhood; (2) value and condition of the improvements on the premises; (3) nearest area to which
the owner may relocate; (4) cost of such relocation; (5) other
29 Id. at 182, 121 So. at 617.

30 "The Louisiana decisions in this field ... sound more like Cossack interpretations
of Moscovite ukases than utterances of a court operating under the benign provisions
of Magna Carta." Fratcher, Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repairs
of Existing Structures, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 642, 644 (1937).
31 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954). The Gage case has several approving
commentators, see 8 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1955); 7 STAN. L. REV. 415 (1955);

See also 6 W. REs. L. REV.

182 (1955).
32 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); See also Anderson,

Amortization of Nonconforming Uses-A Preliminary Appraisal of Harbison v. City of
Buffalo, 10 SYRAcusE L. REV. 44 (1959); Note, 30 MIss. L.J. 210 (1959).
83 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d at 461, 274 P.2d at 45.
84

Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 44.
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reasonable factors and costs.85 In Harbison, the city had refused to
issue a license to operate a junk yard after a three-year amortization
period had lapsed. The petitioner obtained an order directing the city
to issue the license, and the order was sustained by the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division. The court of appeals remanded the case
to the trial court with instructions to examine the detriment to the
land holder in light of the above criteria and stated that if the public
benefit outweighed the private loss the ordinance was to be considered reasonable and not arbitrary. The lower court heard evidence
that the structure was worth $10,747, the land worth $5,347, and the
cost of moving $20,000; thus, the trial court held the ordinance unreasonable and therefore null and void as to the petitioner.8 6
The court in the instant case did not recount sufficient facts to
enable a complete analysis under the rationale of the Gage and
Harbisoncases, but with the facts that are given it seems logical that
the ordinance would have been found unreasonable as it applied to
the relators' use. Such a determination would have rendered the
ordinance null and void as to the relators' use without the necessity
of declaring "amortization zoning" unconstitutional. The relators
could have proven that the neighborhood, with its taverns, stores
and planing mill, would not have been benefited by the closing of the
lumber yard. The neighborhood's peculiar problems of fire prevention, traffic congestion, and police protection would have remained
basically the same with or without the relators' business. As in
Nectow the public welfare would not have been promoted by the
enforcement of the ordinance, since the use at issue was compatible
with the surrounding conditions. The relators could prove that their
loss would be more than merely the storage yard, since the adjacent
garage and office would be of less use to them after the yard was
closed. It seems likely that, when compared with the negligible public
gain, the value of the relators' loss would enable the court to arrive
at a decision similar to that in the final trial of Harbison. No facts
were introduced relative to the availability or cost of relocation but,
in light of the foregoing, the cost of moving the established business
would have to be at an extreme minimum before a Gage decision
could be reached.
In Hoffmann, the Missouri Supreme Court has chosen to disapprove of the concept of amortization zoning. In the opinion of the
35 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d at 563-64, 152 N.E.2d at 47, 176 N.Y.S.2d
at 606.
36

44

CORNELL

L.Q. 450, 451 (1959).
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court the important consideration was that the use was lawful and
had existed prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. This
consideration prompted the court to give the relators a perpetual
right to stack lumber on their land as a "vested right." Under the
facts in Hoffmann, the court had an excellent opportunity to approve
both the concept and the constitutionality of amortization zoning and
still protect the private rights of the relators. The fact that they did
not do so indicates that in the eyes of the Missouri Supreme Court
the value of an individual vested property right is far greater than the
countervailing rights of society as protected by the broad sweep of
the police power.
GLENN MITCHELL

